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Jerónimo Pardo's analysis of the problems raised by some popular 
trinitarian paralogisms is studied in this paper. The purpose is to show 
how the notions employed by the theologians in order to solve theological 
problems were introduced into a textbook on logic to deal with some 
genuinely logical problems. First, the problem, common to all logical 
approaches, of achieving a fine-grained analysis of the logical form of 
syllogistical inferences. Second, the problem, typical of the terminist 





1. Terminist logic and the Trinity: some late-medieval theologians in a 
post-medieval textbook on logic 
 
Many studies have been devoted to showing the various aspects of the 
influence of medieval logic in Christian theology (see, for example, the 
works cited in [4, p. 183]). Thanks to these, we know how some medieval 
logical tools were applied to theological discussions. A widely studied 
topic is the application of the medieval theory of the ‘properties of terms’ 
(proprietates terminorum) to the specific problems generated by the 
complexity of trinitarian theology ([1], [2], [6] – [9], [10]). 
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The Catholic doctrine of the Trinity (with a God who is one simple 
Essence and at the same time three Persons with different properties) is 
found to produce some paradoxes when it is arranged in accordance with 
the patterns of Aristotelian syllogistics. The terms used in trinitarian 
contexts (‘Essentia divina,’ ‘Pater,’ ‘Filius,’ ‘Trinitas,’ ‘generans,’ 
‘spirans’...) allow us to construct some syllogisms which seem to follow 
the rules of Aristotelian logic but also seem to have true premises and a 
false conclusion. Among other responses, one very influential one lies in 
applying to the problematic cases the analytical tools provided by the 
theory of the proprietates terminorum. We can see this practice in the 
works of some brilliant theologians of the fourteenth century, such as 
Gregory of Rimini, Adam Wodeham and Peter of Ailly. 
These theologians saw the notions and distinctions belonging to the theory 
of the proprietates terminorum as a means to save the rationality of their 
theological discourse. But the connection logic-theology can be seen the 
other way round: not from the perspective of the theologians, but from the 
perspective of the logicians, who are confronted with a new domain of 
application for a well established and accepted logical doctrine. This is the 
perspective that I will examine. 
I will base my analyses on the work of a post-medieval logician, the 
Spaniard Jerónimo Pardo, who was a master of Arts and bachelor in 
Theology at the University of Paris at the very end of the fifteenth century. 
His Medulla Dyalectices (printed in Paris in 1500, and reprinted shortly 
after Pardo's death in 1505)1 offers a privileged viewpoint to look at the 
discussions that took place more than a century before. Pardo is 
transferring the logical discussions that were placed in a theological 
context to their proper context, that of logic. In this context, the doctrinal 
concerns are no longer present, so Pardo is able to assess each notion and 
distinction on its own, just in terms of its logical value.2 
                                                 
1 There is no modern edition of this work. I will quote from the 1505 edition, referring 
to it as MD. A provisional transcription of the relevant passages can be found at:  
http://www.unav.es/filosofia/pilzarbe1/medulla_dyalectices/medulla_dyalectices.html 
2 Sometimes Pardo gives the name of the theologian who employed the notion he is 
discussing (and, for example, he quotes literally some passages from Gregory's and 
Peter's commentaries on the Sentences), but most of the time the author of the opinion 
is not identified but hidden under the expressions ‘aliqui dicunt,’ ‘alii dicunt,’ 
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Terminist logic was re-flourishig at that moment at the University of Paris, 
and Pardo was firmly convinced that it was the correct tool to carry out 
logical analyses. As far as syllogistical inference is concerned, the chapter 
De Syllogismis is fully devoted to show how the theory of the properties of 
terms can be used to dissolve any counterexample that might seem to 
threaten the Aristotelian doctrine. In this context, the different trinitarian 
paralogisms that were discussed in the theological works are just providing 
some examples of propositions that can be used to test the power of the 
terminist techniques of analysis.3 
 
2. Jerónimo Pardo's theory of the syllogism: in search of the logical 
form 
 
Chapter nine of Pardo's Medulla Dyalectices focuses on the categorical 
syllogism, which is defined as a kind of formal consequence. Being a 
formal consequence, the validity of a syllogism should be characterized 
independently of any content. To this end, Pardo gives the Aristotelian 
rules dici de omni and dici de nullo a prominent role, as being the 
regulative principles of any categorical syllogism.4 
In Pardo's words, this is the condition that a syllogism has to meet in order 
to be immediately governed by the principle dici de omni: 
 
Dici de omni: A syllogism is immediately governed by the dici de omni 
when nothing can be subsumed under the distributed subject of the major 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘communiter solet poni,’ etc. A further task to be done, which lies beyond the scope of 
this article, is that of identifying the supporters of every notion and distinction. 
3 Pardo's Medulla can thus be added to the list given in [5, p. 70] of post-medieval 
textbooks which use some trinitarian paralogisms in discussing the syllogism. 
4 Omnis autem talis sillogismus altera duarum regularum necesse est regulari: aut 
enim est affirmativus, et sic regulandus est per dici de omni, aut negativus, et sic 
regulandus est per dici de nullo. Que dicuntur principia regulativa sillogismorum 
tanta et talia, ut omnis sillogismus qui altera duarum regularum regulantur bonus et 
regularis dicatur et econverso, omnis autem qui altera harum regularum non 
regulatur, irregularis et inordinatus est dicendus et econverso. Ideo, omnem bonum 
sillogismum necesse est alteri harum regularum se conformare et omnem malum alicui 
harum se difformare; et ut unico complectatur verbo, cuiuslibet mali sillogismi solutio 
hec debet esse: quia non regulatur per dici de omni aut per dici de nullo (MD, fo. 
126va). 
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premise, of which the predicate of the major premise is not also affirmed in 
the conclusion. 
 
This happens when a) the major premise is a universal affirmative 
proposition, by means of which the predicate is affirmed of everything that 
the subject is said of; b) in the minor premise the subject of the major one 
is said of something, these things being then ‘subsumed’ under that term; 
and c) in the conclusion the predicate of the major premise is said of (at 
least some of) the things that were subsumed in the minor premise. For 
example, if we affirm in the major premise that every human being is an 
animal, and then in the second premise we subsume something, say 
Socrates, under ‘human being,’ then we are allowed in the conclusion to 
say of Socrates that he is an animal.5 
In order for a syllogism to be immediately governed by the principle dici 
de omni, the major premise has to be de omni, that is, it has to affirm the 
predicate of whatever the subject is said of. This is usually accounted for in 
terms of distributio, which is the kind of suppositio that corresponds to the 
terms in the scope of a universal syncategorem, such as ‘omnis.’ 
The principle dici de nullo is analogously formulated and explained for the 
case of universal negative propositions. Pardo affirms that for any good 
syllogism we should be able to show that it is governed (either 
immediately or mediately) by one of these principles, and that for any bad 
syllogism we should be able to show how it is not governed by any of 
them. Let me summarise Pardo's proposal by the following General Rule: 
 
General Rule: A necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of a 
syllogism is that it is governed (either immediately or mediately) by the 
dici de omni or dici de nullo. 
                                                 
5
Unde sillogismus regulatur immediate per dici de omni quando nichil est sumere sub 
subiecto distributo maioris de quo non denotetur dici predicatum maioris in 
conclusione; ita quod in maiori propositione denotatur predicatum dici affirmative de 
quocunque dicitur subiectum, et in minore denotatur subiectum maioris dici de aliquo 
assumpto in minore, et in conclusione denotatur predicatum maioris dici de aliquo 
quod assumebatur in minore. Ut si dicam: omnis homo est animal, denotatur quod de 
quocunque verum est dicere quod est homo verum est dicere quod est animal; in hac 
minore: sed Sortes est homo, ly homo denotatur dici de aliquo; inferendo: ergo Sortes 
est animal, ly animal denotatur dici de illo assumpto in minori (MD, fo. 126va). 
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Pardo devotes almost a half of the chapter De Sillogismis to discussing the 
moods Barbara and Darii, as they are immediately governed by the 
principle dici de omni, so they have (along with Celarent and Ferio, 
immediately governed by the dici de nullo) a founding character with 
respect to the remaining valid moods. His discussion always takes the same 
path: he starts by presenting some counterexamples (that is, some 
syllogisms that seem to have the form of one or other valid mood, but that 
seem to have true premises and a false conclusion, which is prohibited in 
the case of a valid inference); he then defines the logical notions and 
introduces the distinctions that he deems relevant for the solution; and he 
finally solves the counterexample by showing, with the help of the 
previously established notions and distinctions, either that the alleged 
syllogism is defective in its form or that, though it has the correct form, 
one of the premises is not true. The solutions proposed for the basic moods 
are taken as a model for the remaining moods, which Pardo does not 
analyse in such detail. 
As is stated above, Pardo entrusts the solution of the different paralogisms 
to various terminist theories (namely, the ones of suppositio, appellatio and 
ampliatio). The terminist notions and distinctions are thus used as a tool to 
safeguard the formal character of the syllogistical inference. In this 
context, many cases of trinitarian syllogisms are presented, as the peculiar 
semantics of the divine terms raises some special problems for the 
terminist approach to the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism. 
As a matter of fact, the first counterexample that Pardo offers is a 
syllogism with trinitarian terms, which seems to have a Barbara-form but 
where the conclusion does not seem to follow from the premises (since, 
according to orthodoxy, the premises are true and the conclusion is false): 
 
(1) Omnis Essentia divina est Pater, 
 omnis Filius est Essentia divina, 
 ergo omnis Filius est Pater. 
 
 Every divine Essence is the Father, 
 every Son is the divine Essence, 
therefore every Son is the Father. 
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Should this syllogism indeed have a Barbara-form, it would be governed 
by the principle dici de omni. That is, in the major premise one would be 
denoting that of whatever the subject is said, of the same thing the 
predicate is said; and in the minor premise one would be denoting that the 
subject of the major one is said of something; then, in the conclusion one 
would be denoting that the predicate of the major premise is said of the 
same thing that has been subsumed in the minor one. So, the application of 
the General Rule simply dissolves the paralogism, as we have the 
following two possibilities: either ‘omnis Essentia divina est Pater’ is de 
omni, and then the syllogism is a valid one, but the major premise is false 
(and thus it is not a problem that the conclusion is also false); or ‘omnis 
Essentia divina est Pater’ is not de omni, and then the syllogism is an 
invalid one (and thus it is not a problem that the premises are true and the 
conclusion is false).6 
The possibility that the universal proposition ‘omnis Essentia divina est 
Pater’ is not de omni is allowed by the peculiar semantics of the divine 
terms. The term ‘Essentia divina’ can be said not only of the very divine 
Essence, but also of each of the divine Persons. If the predicate ‘Pater’ in 
‘omnis Essentia divina est Pater’ is predicated of the divine Essence but 
not of each divine Person, this proposition cannot be said to be de omni. 
This means that, as far as trinitarian propositions are concerned, the 
syncategorem ‘omnis,’ which was usually considered to suffice to effect 
the required distribution in order for a syllogism to be governed by the dici 
de omni, seems to be no longer sufficient. The schema: 
 
B1. Omne A est B, 
 omne C est A, 
 ergo omne C est B, 
                                                 
6
Dicendum enim est illos sillogismos esse bonos si regulantur per dici de omni, ita 
quod in maiori denotetur quod de quocunque dicitur subiectum dicitur predicatum et 
in minori de aliquo denotetur dici subiectum, in conclusione vero de eodem denotetur 
dici predicatum. Sed maior est falsa in qua dicitur omnis essentia divina est pater, 
quia non de quocumque verum est dicere quod est essentia divina de eodem verum est 
dicere quod est pater, nam filius est essentia divina et tamen filius non est pater. Ideo, 
dicentes illum sillogismum bonum esse si maior sit de omni recte solvunt, si enim 
maior non est de omni non regulatur mediate per dici de omni, maior enim debet esse 
regula de omni secundum quam maior et conclusio sunt regulande (MD, fo. 127ra). 
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 Every A is B, 
every C is A, 
therefore every C is B, 
 
which could at first sight be considered as capturing the structure of the 
mood Barbara, is shown by the trinitarian counterexample to be an 
inadequate anlysis of the Barbara-form. 
The trinitarian domain is putting a high level of demand on the formality of 
consequences. If Pardo wants the syllogistic mood Barbara to be a formal 
consequence, he needs to go deeper into specifying its logical form. The 
notions and distinctions that Pardo is importing from the theological 
debates find in the Medulla their natural place, as they are introduced in 
successive steps to achieve a better grasp of the logical form. 
 
3. Proprietates terminorum and syllogistical form: the notion of 
distributio completa 
 
Let us go back to example (1). In the minor premise, the peculiar semantics 
of the divine terms allows one to predicate ‘Essentia divina’ of ‘Filius.’ 
But in order for the syllogism to be governed by the dici de omni, the 
major premise must affirm the predicate of whatever the subject is said of. 
This raises a question concerning the universality of the major premise: 
when we say ‘omnis Essentia divina est Pater,’ are we affirming ‘est Pater’ 
of the Son? The theory of the proprietates terminorum allowed the 
theologians to put the question in semantic terms, either in terms of 
distribution, or in terms of supposition. That is, one can ask: is the term 
‘Essentia divina’ distributed to the divine Son? Or: does the term ‘Essentia 
divina’ supposit for the divine Son? The answers are used by Pardo to 
elaborate a more accurate notion of syllogistical form. 
In order to find an answer that dissolves the paralogism, the theologians 
introduced a distinction between two forms of distribution of the divine 
terms: complete and incomplete. A universal proposition with complete 
distribution has stronger truth-conditions than a universal proposition with 
incomplete distribution. Pardo characterises these notions in terms of the 
notion of inferior, which is part of the terminist technique for specifying 
the truth-conditions of quantified propositions, the descensus to singulars: 
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from a quantified proposition one can descend to a set of singular 
propositions, in which the predicate is said of the inferiora of the common 
term. But, again, the setting of the inferiora of the trinitarian terms is 
affected by their particular semantic behaviour. Pardo distinguishes two 
kinds of inferiora for the divine terms: per se and non-per se. For example, 
he explains that the term ‘Essentia divina’ has only one inferior per se, 
namely ‘haec Essentia divina que est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus,’ 
although in a non-per se sense, ‘Filius’ can also be considered to be an 
inferior of that term. 
Pardo thus formulates the distinction between complete distribution and 
incomplete distribution in the following terms: 
• For a universal proposition in which there is a complete 
distribution to be true, it is required that the predicate is truly said of 
everything that the subject is said of, whether it is per se under the 
subject or it is not. 
• For a universal proposition in which there is an incomplete 
distribution to be true, it is sufficient that the predicate is truly said of 
everything that is per se under the subject.7 
This means that, in order for the syllogism to be governed by the dici de 
omni, the subject of the major premise has to be distributed with complete 
distribution. The domain of the Trinity has thus shown that there are (at 
least) two kinds of universality, one that suffices for the mood Barbara to 
be a formal consequence and one that does not suffice. Thus, the General 
Rule can be specified for the case of the mood Barbara by means of the 
following formulation: 
 
Rule 1: A necessary condition for the validity of a Barbara syllogism is 
that the subject of the major premise ‘A’ is distributed to everything that is 
A (omne quod est A). 
 
                                                 
7
Ad veritatem enim universalis in qua est distributio completa requiritur quod de 
quocunque dicitur subiectum de illo dicatur predicatum sive illud sit per se contentum 
sub subiecto sive non. Sed ad veritatem propositionis universalis cuius subiectum 
distribuitur distributione incompleta sufficit predicatum dici de omni per se contento 
sub subiecto (MD, fo. 127ra-b). 
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The structure of the mood Barbara could then be better expressed by the 
schema: 
 
B2. Omne quod est A est B, 
 omne C est A, 
 ergo omne C est B. 
 
Everything that is A is B, 
every C is A, 
therefore every C is B. 
 
Of course, this distinction does not have any effect in the domain of the 
creatures (unless, says Pardo, one accepts Scotus' proposal of some naturas 
communes per indifferentiam), but it has to be posited if one wants the 
syllogistical consequence to hold independently of any matter. However, a 
further counterexample is going to require a finer analysis of the logical 
form. 
 
4. The correct reading of the universal proposition 
 
Pardo also considers the following example of a syllogism with trinitarian 
terms: 
 
(2) Omnis Essentia divina est Persona, 
 Trinitas est Essentia divina, 
 ergo Trinitas est Persona. 
 
Every divine Essence is a Person, 
the Trinity is the divine Essence, 
therefore the Trinity is a Person. 
 
Even if we apply the previous analysis, the paralogism does not seem to 
dissolve. If we read the major premise as ‘omne quod est Essentia divina 
est Persona’ according to its de omni sense, it is still a true premise, and, 
when joined to the minor premise which is also true, it allows us to draw a 
false conclusion in accordance with the Darii-form. 
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Pardo reports that this problem has led some theologians to say that a 
special kind of supposition is present here, namely a supposition extra 
numerum, as opposed to the supposition in numero,8 grounded on the fact 
that although whatever is the divine Essence is a Person (omne quod est 
Essentia divina est Persona), nevertheless not all things that are the divine 
Essence are a Person (non omnia que sunt Essentia divina sunt Persona), 
because three Persons are the divine Essence but they are not a Person. The 
solution of the paralogism involves the contrast between ‘omne quod est 
Essentia divina est Persona,’ which expresses the in numero sense of the 
major premise, and ‘omnia que sunt Essentia divina sunt Persona,’ which 
expresses the extra numerum sense. 
But Pardo does not consider that this distinction is necessary to dissolve 
the paralogism. All that is needed is a better reading of the de omni sense 
of the universal proposition ‘omnis Essentia divina est Persona.’ In the 
light of example (2), we can see that the expression ‘omne quod est’ does 
not provide a correct reading of the complete distribution. Instead, the 
expression ‘omne ens quod est’ has to be used. This allows us to solve the 
paralogism in analogy with (1), by showing that, when taken in its de omni 
sense, the major premise is false. ‘Omne ens quod est Essentia divina est 
Persona’ is a false proposition, because the Trinity is in fact a being which 
is the divine Essence (as the Trinity is the very divine Essence, which is of 
course a being which is the divine Essence), but the Trinity is not a 
Person.9 The ‘ens’ has the effect of fully extensionalising the analysis, thus 
avoiding the problems derived from the peculiar semantics of the 
trinitarian terms.10 
This allows us to give a finer analysis of the Barbara-form: 
                                                 
8A similar distinction can be found in Henry Totting of Oyta (see [6], [10]). 
9
Hiis tamen non obstantibus dico quod nullo sillogismo quis cogere potest ponere 
distributionem extra numerum que predicto argumento credebatur concludi. Dico 
enim illam propositionem: omnis essentia divina est persona in hoc sensu: omne ens 
quod est essentia divina est persona esse falsam, quia concedendum est quod trinitas 
est ens quod est essentia divina (bene enim sequitur: trinitas est essentia divina, ergo 
trinitas est ens quod est essentia divina) et tamen trinitas non est persona (MD, fo. 
128ra). 
10Simo Knuuttila has studied the Abelardian origin of the extensional approach [4, pp. 
192 – 198]. The ‘omne ens quod est’ is playing a similar role as the ‘idem quod’ 
device in Abelard's proposal. See also [3, p. 130] and [5, p. 73]. 
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B3. Omne ens quod est A est B, 
 omne C est A, 
 ergo omne C est B. 
 
Every being that is A is B, 
every C is A, 
therefore every C is B. 
 
And also a new formulation of the rule governing the validity of the mood 
Barbara: 
 
Rule 2: A necessary condition for the validity of a Barbara syllogism is 
that the subject of the major premise ‘A’ is distributed to every being 
which is A (omne ens quod est A). 
 
5. Proprietates terminorum and syllogistical form: the notion of 
supponere mediate 
 
The distinction between two kinds of universality can also be formulated in 
terms of suppositio, the property of terms by virtue of which they stand for 
something when they are used in a proposition. Pardo quotes Peter of 
Ailly,11 who distinguishes, as far as divine terms are concerned, between 
suppositing immediate and suppositing mediate. It should be noted that he 
is not introducing some new non-standard species of supposition, he is just 
distinguishing two ways in which a divine term, owing to the peculiarities 
of the trinitarian domain, can supposit for its supposita. 
The test to distinguish whether a term is suppositing in one or the other 
way is one of convertibility: 
• A term supposits mediate for something, say A, when the term 
supposits for A but it is not convertible with the corresponding term 
‘A’ by means of the expression ‘omnis res que est A.’ 
• A term supposits immediate for something, say A, when the 
term supposits for A and it is convertible with the corresponding 
term ‘A’ by means of the expression ‘omnis res que est A.’ 
                                                 
11 From book I, question 5 of Peter's commentary on the Sentences. 
 251 
For example, the term ‘Essentia divina’ supposits for the Father, but it is 
not convertible with the term ‘Father’ in the terms ‘omnis res que est 
Essentia divina est Pater.’ Thus, ‘Essentia divina’ supposits just in a 
mediated way for the Father. In contrast, the term ‘Pater’ does supposit 
immediately for the Father, as the testing proposition ‘omnis res que est 
Pater est Pater’ is true. 
Pardo grounds this distinction in a parallel distinction between two ways of 
signifying that are peculiar to the trinitarian terms. On the one hand, each 
divine term has been imposed to signify something. This original 
imposition determines what he calls the ‘primary signification’ of the term. 
But, on the other hand, when we are talking about the Trinity, the thing 
which is primarily signified has some ontological connections with some 
other things that the term has not been imposed to signify. For example, 
the divine Essence, which is primarily signified by the term ‘Essentia 
divina,’ is identical with the Father. In virtue of this ontological 
connection, we can say that the term ‘Essentia divina’ also signifies the 
Father. But this is not by imposition, but rather by the very nature of the 
thing which is primarily signified. Thus, Pardo calls this a ‘secondary 
signification.’ As supposition is derived from signification, each divine 
term has two ways of suppositing: it supposits immediately for the things 
that are primarily signified, and it supposits in a mediated way for the 
things that are secondarily signified.12 
The two kinds of universality, the one that suffices for the mood Barbara 
to be a formal consequence and the one that does not suffice, can thus be 
formulated in terms of supposition. If the subject of the major premise is 
taken as standing for just the things that it immediately supposits for, then 
the universality will not be sufficient for the requirements of formality. 
Instead, in order for the syllogism to be governed by the dici de omni, the 
                                                 
12
Et si dicas secundum istum modum dicendi quomodo declaranda est illa duplex 
suppositio premissa, mediata scilicet et immediata. Respondeo: suppositio ex 
significatione cognoscenda est, ideo cum ponatur talis duplex suppositio conformiter 
ponenda est duplex significatio: una primaria, secundum quam terminus ab impositore 
habet ut aliquid det intelligere, et cum iste terminus pater ab impositore non habet nisi 
quod significet patrem, ideo cum supponat pro patre immediatam suppositionem 
habet. Sed secundario significat rem idemptificatam cum illa re ad quam primo est 
impositus ad significandum, et hoc non est propter impositionem sed propter naturam 
rei significate que talis est ut habeat talem idemptitatem (MD, fo. 127vb). 
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subject of the major premise has to be taken as standing for both the things 
that it immediately and mediately supposits for. 
This is how Peter of Ailly's distinctions, which he had used to solve his 
theological problems, are used by Pardo in his attempts to solve a logical 
problem: the sharpening of the notion of syllogistical form. Again, the 
General Rule can be specified for the case of the mood Barbara by means 
of the following formulation: 
 
Rule 3: A necessary condition for the validity of a Barbara syllogism is 
that the subject of the major premise is taken as standing for both the 
supposita that it immediately and mediately supposits for. 
 
Both the notion of complete distribution and the notion of mediately 
suppositing are formulated with the help of the complex expression ‘omne 
ens quod est’ (or the equivalent ‘omnis res que est’), which extensionalises 
the analysis in a way that is comparable with the modern quantificational 
approach. With this tool, one can provide an analysis of the trinitarian 
examples which dissolves their paradoxical character. But, before the 
logical value of this expression is definitely established, it has to overcome 
some difficulties. 
 
6. Latin as a tool for analysis. The supposition of the term ‘Pater’ 
 
In fact, Pardo does not accept the notion of completa distributio without 
discussion (along with the corresponding notion of supponere mediate), 
when it is spelled out by means of the expression ‘omne ens quod est.’ 
These notions, useful as they have proved to solve the theological 
problems, both raise some logical problems to which the logician must pay 
attention. 
First, Pardo poses an objection against the notion of supponere mediate: it 
seems that it could be said that the term ‘Pater’ supposits for the Son, once 
it has been admitted that the term 'Pater' supposits for the divine Essence.13 
                                                 
13 Sed probaretur apparenter contra istum doctorem quod iste terminus pater mediate 
supponit pro filio si iste terminus pater mediate supponat pro essentia. Sic enim 
arguo: pater supponit pro omni ente quod est pater et pro eo distribuitur si completa 
distributione distribuatur, sed filius est ens quod est pater (sequitur enim: est essentia, 
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The point is how far we can go with the possibility that ontological 
connections would extend the supposition of the terms beyond that which 
they have been imposed to signify. If the identity of the Father with the 
Essence leads one to admit that the term ‘Pater’ mediately supposits for the 
Essence, then it could be thought that the identity of the Essence with the 
Son would further lead one to admit that the the term ‘Pater’ mediately 
supposits for the Son. 
Pardo reports that some theologians were overcome by this objection, and 
that they therefore added a new distinction within the notion of mediate 
supposition: ‘primary’ mediate supposition and ‘secondary’ mediate 
supposition. When a term is taken in primary mediate supposition, it 
supposits for the thing which is identical to the immediate suppositum. 
When a term is taken in secondary mediate supposition, it supposits for the 
thing which is identical to the thing which is identical to the immediate 
suppositum. It seems as if the ontological connections would allow for 
limitless new supposita (that is, if ‘Pater’ supposits for the Essence, the 
identity of the Son with the Essence forces one to admit that ‘Pater’ also 
supposits for the Son), although the logical distinction between ‘primary’ 
and ‘secondary’ seems to safeguard the idea that the Father is not the Son. 
But Pardo does not agree with this limitless extension of the supposita of a 
divine term. 
This problem extends to the notion of complete distribution, as a term that 
is taken with complete distribution is taken as standing for both its mediate 
and immediate supposita. Does the term ‘Pater’ stands for the Son when it 
is taken with complete distribution, that is, the one required for the mood 
Barbara to be a formal consequence? Pardo does not want it to do that, but 
the problem will be very hard to solve, as what is involved here is no less 
than the limits of a logical analysis that is carried out by means of a natural 
language. The supposita of the term ‘Pater,’ when it is taken with complete 
distribution, for example in the proposition ‘omnis Pater est Pater,’ are 
determined by means of the Latin expression ‘ens quod est Pater.’ But the 
peculiar semantics of the trinitarian terms raises doubts about the adequacy 
                                                                                                                                                        
que essentia est pater), ergo est ens quod est pater, ergo iste terminus pater supponit 
pro filio (MD, fo. 127va). 
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of this natural language expression to serve the purposes it has been 
designed for. 
In order to determine the supposita of the term ‘Pater’ when it is taken with 
complete distribution, one has to find the things of which ‘this is a being 
which is Father’ can be truly said. But in order to find this, one has to 
analyse the complex term ‘ens quod est Pater.’ Pardo uses in the analysis 
another terminist notion: the property of restrictio, which modifies the 
‘normal’ supposition of a term, making it stand for fewer things than it 
normally stands for. Different kinds of restricting terms affect the restricted 
term in different ways. The question here is how the clause ‘quod est Pater’ 
is restricting the term ‘ens’ in the expression ‘ens quod est Pater.’ 
Pardo reports the opinion of those who think that in the complex 
expression ‘ens quod est Pater’ the term ‘ens’ is restricted to standing for 
the same things that the term ‘Pater’ stands for, just as in ‘ens quod est 
Sortes currit’ the term ‘ens’ does not supposit for any being, but it is 
restricted to stand just for Socrates. But Pardo's opinion is different, again 
motivated by the peculiar semantics of the trinitarian terms: when the 
restricting term is following a copula implicationis (that is, the copula 
which accompanies the relative ‘qui’), it does not restrict the term to stand 
for the thing that the restricting term stands for (in this case, for the 
Father), but for the thing which is the suppositum of the restricting term (in 
this case, for the thing which is Father), and this allows the term ‘Pater’ to 
supposit for the divine Essence. Again, a device for extensionalising the 
analysis (‘pro ente quod est Pater’) is operating.14 
But the device demands that Pardo should put a limit on it. The problem is 
that, in order to determine the supposition of the term ‘Pater’ when it is 
used in a proposition, another supposition is involved, namely the 
                                                 
14
Respondeo: quando aliquis terminus restringitur per terminum sequentem copulam 
implicationis non habet ille terminus ex vi restrictionis quod stet precise pro eodem 
pro quo stat precise ille terminus restringens, sed habet tantum ille terminus ex vi 
restrictionis ut stet pro eo quod est illud pro quo supponit ille terminus restringens, 
sive illud sit alia res sive non. Exemplum: ut si per impossibile ponerentur due essentie 
divine quarum una esset pater et filius alia vero precise esse spiritus sanctus, tunc sic 
dicendo: essentia divina que est pater, ly essentia divina non staret precise pro esentia 
que est spiritus sanctus, staret tamen pro essentia que est filius, quia essentia que est 
filius est essentia que est pater; nec tamen debet dici quod ly essentia stet precise pro 
eodem pro quo ly pater (MD, fo. 128ra). 
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supposition of the term ‘Pater’ which appears in the complex expression 
‘ens quod est Pater.’ The peculiar semantics of the trinitarian terms would 
allow the first ‘Pater’ to supposit for the Son unless some limit is put on 
the supposition of the second ‘Pater.’ Pardo points out that the restricting 
term ‘Pater’ has to be taken as suppositing immediately. If it were taken as 
suppositing mediately, it would restrict the term ‘ens’ to stand for the thing 
which is the being which is Father (ens quod est ens quod est Pater), and 
this would allow the term ‘Pater’ to supposit for the Son (which is actually 
a being which is Father, namely, the Essence). The appropriate use of the 
notion of supponere immediate thus serves to dispel any doubts as to the 
adequacy of the expression ‘ens quod est Pater’ as a tool for logical 
analysis. 
 
7. Latin as a tool for analysis. The universality of ‘omnis Pater est 
Pater’ 
 
When the problem is approached in terms of the notion of distributio 
completa, we encounter analogous difficulties. Pardo does not want the 
term ‘Pater’ to be able to supposit for the Son, but how can he prevent the 
term ‘Pater’ from being distributed to the Son in the proposition ‘omnis 
Pater est Pater?’ The complete universal sense of this proposition will be 
expresed by the following: ‘omne ens quod est Pater est Pater.’ How 
should this new proposition be interpreted? Pardo finds the elements he 
needs for an adequate answer in the discussions of the theologians 
concerning the following paralogism: 
 
(3) Omne ens quod est Pater est Pater, 
 Filius est ens quod est Pater, 
 ergo Filius est Pater, 
 
Every being that is the Father is the Father, 
The Son is a being that is the Father, 
Therefore the Son is the Father, 
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which seems to have the form of a Darii mood, and prima facie true 
premises.15 The theologians armed themselves with different logical tools 
in order to avoid the unwanted conclusion that the Son is the Father. Pardo 
examines in the first place the tools developed by Peter of Ailly, which he 
finds unsatisfactory. 
Trinitarian paralogisms had convinced Peter of Ailly that plain universality 
did not suffice in order for a syllogism to be governed by the dici de omni. 
What is needed is that the major premise should say that ‘of whatever the 
subject is said, of the same thing the predicate is said.’ But, while in the 
domain of the creatures the sign ‘omnis’ was thought to be enough for this 
task, the domain of the Trinity has shown that it is not enough, and 
consequently that the schema ‘omne A est B’ does not sufficiently 
expresses the universal form which is required for the syllogism to be 
valid. Thus, Peter made a distinction between being universal simpliciter 
and being universal secundum quid. A proposition is universal simpliciter 
when the subject is distributed as a matter of form (de forma), for example, 
when one says ‘omnis res que es A est B’ or ‘quicquid est A est B.’ In 
contrast, a proposition can be said to be universal secundum quid, that is, in 
an improper sense, when the distribution is not formally stated, and this 
happens whenever one just says ‘omne A est B.’ This means that, 
according to Peter, the universal syncategorem ‘omnis’ does not suffice to 
make a proposition universal enough (sufficienter universalis) in order to 
be the premise of a Barbara syllogism. Thus, he proposes the introduction 
of some complex syncategorems, such as ‘omnis res que est,’ ‘nulla res 
que est,’ as needed for the complete distribution of the subject in a 
simpliciter universal proposition. 
Once this kind of complex expression has been admitted as a universal 
syncategorem, Peter of Ailly is able to offer a double reading of the 
proposition ‘omne ens quod est Pater est Pater’ which is the major premise  
                                                 
15 Et confirmatur, quia quero an ista propositio: omnis pater est pater, aut est vera in 
sensu de omni aut non. Si dicas quod non, ergo pro aliquo supponit subiectum pro quo 
non supponit predicatum et illud non potest esse nisi filius aut spiritus sanctus. Si 
dicas quod est vera in sensu de omni, contra: sensus de omni est iste: omne ens quod 
est pater est pater, sed ipsum ostendo esse falsum, quia bene sequitur: omne ens quod 
est pater est pater, filius est ens quod est pater, ergo filius est pater. Premisse sunt 
vere, ergo et conclusio, et consequentia tenet in darii (MD, fo. 127va). 
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of the example (3), depending on which part of it is acting as a universal 
syncategorem: a) If the syncategorem is the simple term ‘omne,’ then it is 
distributing the whole complex ‘ens quod est Pater,’ but then the syllogism 
will not be governed by the dici de omni, as the sign ‘omnis’ is not 
sufficient to make the complete distribution that is required. b) If the 
syncategorem is the complex ‘omne ens quod est,’ then it is distributing 
only the term ‘Pater,’ and then the syllogism will not be valid either, even 
if the distribution is indeed complete in virtue of the special syncategorem, 
because the subsumption in the minor premise has not been made under 
‘Pater’ but under ‘ens quod est Pater.’ That is, according to Peter, the 
example (3) cannot be governed at all by the principle dici de omni (the 
problem being either one of distribution or one of subsumption). 
Pardo rejects the solution of putting a special syncategorem in order to 
make the complete distribution of the term ‘Pater,’ as the effect would be 
too strong. A sign distributing the term ‘Pater’ to any being which is Father 
would make it stand for the Son, as the Son is a being which is Father. He 
prefers to think that the syncategorem in ‘omne ens quod est Pater’ is the 
usual ‘omnis,’ which is distributing the term ‘ens quod est Pater’ (where 
the ‘ens’ is restricted by the ‘quod est Pater’ in the way explained 
before).16 
The solution finally accepted by Pardo is that of Gregory of Rimini, who 
adopts the same strategy that proved useful for solving example (1). In 
order for the syllogism (3) to be good, the major premise has to be de 
omni, and this requires the distribution to be complete. That is, the subject 
‘ens quod est Pater’ must be distributed to everything which is a being 
which is Father (omne ens quod est ens quod est Pater). Read in this way, 
the major premise ‘omne ens quod est Pater est Pater’ is false and the 
paralogism is solved.17 
                                                 
16
Si vero dicatur quod illa complexa: omnis res que est, nulla res que est, licet non sint 
sincathegoreumata supplent tamen quedam sincathegoreumata incomplexa 
distribuentia distributione completa. Arguitur sic: ex hoc sequitur quod ille terminus 
pater per illa signa quecunque sint illa distribuitur pro omni ente quod est pater et 
distribuitur pro filio, quia filius est ens quod est pater. Et sic habetur intentum quod 
iste terminus pater mediate supponit pro filio (MD, fo. 127vb). 
17 Et ad sillogismum illud pretactum, cum arguitur: bene sequitur omne ens quod est 
pater est pater, filius est ens quod est pater, ergo filius est pater, dicitur 
quemadmodum dicit ille doctor qui prima facie videbatur reprobandus: quod illa 
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But what is interesting is how the distinction between the two readings of 
‘omne ens quod est Pater est Pater’ (as either de omni or not de omni) 
allows Pardo to save the truth of ‘omnis Pater est Pater.’ Again, Pardo has 
to put a limit on the application of the logical tools that the theologians 
employed within the domain of the Trinity. Although the proposition 
which is used to formulate the de omni sense of ‘omnis Pater est Pater’ 
(that is, ‘omne ens quod est Pater est Pater’) can be interpreted in a de omni 
sense when it is put as a premise of a syllogism, when it is employed as a 
tool for logical analysis it has to be interpreted according to its non-de 
omni sense, as this is the only way for the proposition ‘omnis Pater est 
Pater’ to be true in its de omni sense.18 
We can see how the tools that the theologians had employed to solve the 
trinitarian paralogisms are being used by a logician to give the specific 
sense of the Latin expressions which are operating as metalinguistic 
devices for logical analysis. Pardo discovers that the same logical 
distinctions that are applied to the problems raised in the trinitarian domain 
by the object-language expressions can be applied to the problems raised 
by the metalinguistic expressions which spell out the sense of the object-
language expressions. With the help of these tools, Pardo is able to 
establish the logical value of the complex terms ‘ens quod est Pater’ and 
‘omne ens quod est Pater’ as a tool for the analyis of the supposition and of 
the complete distribution of the object-language terms, respectively. Thus, 
the distinctions that Pardo has found in the theological discussions can be 
employed by the logician not only as a tool for the logical analysis of the 
syllogistical form, but also for the assessment of the very logical devices 
that are being used in this analysis. 
 
8. Conclusion: What has to be said about syllogistical form? 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
maior est distinguenda. Aut est de omni seu completa distributione distribuitur, et tunc 
maior est falsa, quia sensus est: omne ens quod est ens quod est pater est pater, et hoc 
est falsum. Si vero subiectum distribuatur incompleta distributione maior est vera, sed 
non sequetur quod non regulatur per dici de omni (MD, fo. 128ra-b). 
18
Est igitur talis ordo: nam ista propositio omnis pater est pater est vera sive sit 
distributio completa sive incompleta. Et iterum, sensus que habet ut in ea est 
distributio completa est distinguendus, pro eo quod subiectum talis sensus potest 
distribui complete et incomplete, et ibi est status (MD, fo. 128rb). 
 259 
As a final objection to this whole approach, Pardo raises the question: is 
the mood Barbara a formal consequence? The naive objector would say 
that it is not, as we can construct a syllogism with a Barbara-form with true 
premises and false conclusion. In fact, the distinctions of the theologians 
have shown that there is a reading of the premise ‘omnis essentia divina est 
Pater’ that makes syllogism (1) to have true premises and false conclusion. 
The naive objector would say that syllogism (1) has the same form as the 
following, an impeccable example of the Barbara-form: 
 
(4) Omne animal est substantia, 
 omnis homo est animal, 
 ergo omnis homo est substantia. 
 
Every animal is a substance, 
every human being is an animal, 
therefore every human being is a substance. 
 
Thus, either the tools used by the theologians are defective, or syllogistical 
inferences are not actually formal consequences, but they hold in virtue of 
the material elements of discourse. 
But, needless to say, Pardo thinks that there is more to logical form than 
meets the eye, and therefore a better understanding of formality is needed 
to escape from the dilemma. The elements of the logical form that are 
usually taken into account are not sufficient to overcome every objection 
against the formal character of the syllogism. In contrast, Pardo will take 
considerable time specifying the elements which are relevant to the form. 
For the moment, in the light of the trinitarian paralogisms and as far as the 
Barbara-form is concerned, Pardo has made it clear that the kind of 
distribution (complete / incomplete) has to be taken as an ingredient of the 
syllogistical form.19 
If the kind of distribution belongs to the syllogistical form, syllogism (1) 
can only be said to have the same form as syllogism (4) in the case where 
                                                 
19Pardo deals separately with the expository syllogism, in which the middle is a 
singular term. The peculiarity of the trinitarian semantics (a singular term can supposit 
for more than one thing) will eventually call into question the very possibility of 
constructing a valid expository syllogism with trinitarian terms (MD, fo. 139vb-143ra). 
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both major premises are interpreted with complete distribution.20 
According to Pardo, the actual form of the mood Barbara is not B1, as 
logicians were inclined to think before they were confronted with the 
triniarian domain, but B3, which is the one that includes the complete 
distribution as a further component of the syllogistical form. This is an 
example of how the discussions of the theologians have helped the logician 
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